If you’re active online, you may be seeing the word ‘taqiyya’ being hurled as an insult towards Muslims on a regular basis. Anyone on X in the past few days may have seen the especially ugly remarks made by Tommy Robinson (yes that one!) to media commentator Bushra Shaikh in a heated exchange in which he described her as a ‘taqiyya coconut sausage.’ Many of you may be wondering what it means and if you want a more reliable source than Robinson to explain it. Don’t worry, we’ve got you! Zakaya Media turned to Shaykh Michael Mumisa from Cambridge University for a detailed and accurate explanation.
Of course I know what Taqiyya is you sausage.
— Tommy Robinson 🇬🇧 (@TRobinsonNewEra) December 6, 2025
It is DECEPTION.
I didn’t say you hide being a Muslim (that would be pretty stupid given how much of an openly public Muslim you are).
By saying I did suggest that or actually stated that – is by definition DECEIVING people.… https://t.co/5nLF7ibGOH
Taqiyya Explained: Context Versus Conspiracy
In recent years, the term taqiyya has gained currency in far‑right discourse and conspiracy theories across the UK, USA, Australia and beyond. It is often invoked to portray Muslim communities as deceitful, untrustworthy and an inherent threat, with claims that public condemnations of extremist violence or affirmations of democratic values are merely a cover for hidden intentions.
Within this narrative, Muslims are cast as infiltrators who can never be trusted, and positive civic engagement is dismissed as “just taqiyya.” The term is used not in its historical sense but as a political device, transforming a narrow theological and legal concept into a polemical weapon.
In Islamic tradition, taqiyya is a principle permitting a believer to conceal or withhold outward expressions of faith – such as identity, beliefs or practices – only in situations of serious danger, persecution or coercion. It functions as a protective concession rather than a licence for deception.
Early Islamic sources and classical Qur’anic commentaries consistently describe taqiyya not as a doctrine of dishonesty but as a safeguard tied to survival under compulsion. In societies where religious freedom is protected by law, and where legislation prohibits religious hatred, persecution and discrimination, the concept becomes largely irrelevant. Muslims in such contexts are able to practise their faith openly and feel secure under the rule of law, without recourse to protective measures designed for conditions of duress.
When discussed in Islamic jurisprudence, scholars typically refer to two Qur’anic verses that address coercion and the preservation of belief under threat: Qur’an 16:106 and Qur’an 3:28. The first was revealed in the early stages of Islam in Mecca, in connection with believers tortured into recanting their faith, while the second was revealed in Medina amid wartime hostility and real threats to safety. In both contexts, the principle permitted outward compliance only under compulsion, while inward belief remained intact.
Sunni jurists generally interpret taqiyya as a narrow allowance tied specifically to cases of duress, whereas Shia scholars have developed it into a broader doctrine shaped by their community’s historical experience of persecution. Put simply, the question of whether Muslims are “practising taqiyya” depends on whether they – and those making the accusation – believe Muslims are facing persecution for their faith. Outside such conditions of coercion, the charge has no basis in the historical or exegetical record.
The context of Qur’an 16:106
According to early Islamic sources and classical Qur’anic commentaries, the background to Qur’an 16:106 lies in the persecution of one of the first households to embrace Islam in Mecca: the family of Yasir ibn Amir, his wife Sumayya bint Khayyaṭ, and their son Ammar ibn Yasir. All three were early converts with no powerful clan to protect them. Yasir was a Yemeni immigrant to Mecca, while Sumayya was a Black African woman of Abyssinian origin, described in early biographical accounts as having been enslaved. Their lack of tribal support placed them among Mecca’s most vulnerable groups – alongside the poor, the enslaved and the socially marginalised – people who, according to these sources, were among the earliest to respond to Muhammad’s message because they saw it as offering dignity, equality and protection regardless of lineage, gender or social standing.
Early narratives describe the family being targeted by members of the Meccan elite from the Quraysh tribe. These accounts portray an atmosphere in which Sumayya’s gender, ethnicity and class shaped the nature of the abuse she endured. Reports consistently state that she was subjected to verbal insults and physical torture, and that she was killed while refusing to renounce her new faith – making her, in the words of early historians, the first martyr in Islam.
Her husband Yasir is likewise reported to have died under torture. Their son Ammar, still a young man, was forced to witness or endure abuse alongside them. Unlike his parents, who refused to recant, Ammar was eventually compelled under extreme coercion to utter phrases rejecting Muhammad and praising Meccan idols. According to early commentaries, he did so only to end the torture, while his heart remained firm in belief – a distinction explicitly made in several of these reports.
Deeply distressed after his release, Ammar went to the Prophet Muhammad fearing he had committed an unforgivable act. It was in this context, according to the exegetical tradition, that Qur’an 16:106 was revealed:
“Whoever disbelieves in God after having believed – except for the one who is compelled while his heart remains secure in faith…”
Commentators present the verse as a reassurance to Ammar and to other persecuted believers, making clear that a person forced to renounce their faith under torture bears no blame in the sight of God if their inner conviction remains intact.
The episode became one of the most frequently cited examples in Islamic tradition of the early community’s vulnerability, the violence they faced in Mecca, and the principle that coercion removes moral culpability. For Muslims, the family of Yasir – Sumayya in particular – came to symbolise steadfastness, dignity and resistance to oppression in its racial, social and gendered forms.
According to early commentaries and later legal discussions, this verse came to be understood as a key statement on how coercion affects moral responsibility. Scholars interpreted Qur’an 16:106 – revealed in connection with Ammar ibn Yasir’s forced recantation – as establishing the principle that ikrah, or coercion, removes sin when a person outwardly denies their faith to save their life while inwardly remaining committed.
In subsequent Islamic jurisprudence, it became one of the main textual bases for the permissibility of taqiyya, the practice of concealing belief in situations of threat. While Sunni jurists generally treat this as a narrow allowance tied specifically to cases of duress, Shia scholars incorporate it into a broader doctrine shaped by their community’s historical experience of persecution. Across traditions, the verse is cited as affirming that survival under compulsion does not invalidate genuine belief, and that words spoken under threat carry no moral blame.
The context of Qur’an 3:28
According to early sources and Qur’anic commentaries, the verse “Let not the believers take the disbelievers as allies instead of the believers…” (3:28) was revealed in Medina, after the Prophet Muhammad and his followers had migrated from Mecca. At that time, the Muslim community faced hostile conditions, heightened security concerns and the constant risk of conflict. Commentators explain that the verse addressed the dangers of political association and collaboration with enemies during wartime, warning against divided loyalties that could weaken the cohesion of the community. The verse also contains a notable exception:
“except that you fear from them a threat.”
Early exegetes interpreted this as allowing a form of taqiyya – permitting believers to outwardly show compliance under duress while inwardly maintaining their faith. This concession reflected the realities of conflict and vulnerability, acknowledging that some Muslims, particularly those in exposed social or political positions, might need to adopt protective measures for their own safety. In this context, the verse reinforced unity and resilience, while allowing for pragmatic survival strategies in the face of overwhelming pressure.
Far‑right claims that Muslims practise taqiyya whenever they engage positively in civic life rest on a misreading of the Qur’an. While the term is invoked to suggest dishonesty, the contextual reading of the verses invalidates the very argument. Qur’an 16:106 and 3:28 address survival under persecution and coercion, not every day social or political interaction. Both passages were revealed in settings of extreme vulnerability – Mecca under torture and Medina amid wartime hostility – and permitted outward compliance only under compulsion, while inward belief remained intact. To apply these verses to Muslims living openly under the protections of modern law is to strip them of their historical meaning. The result is a polemical distortion: a narrow principle of survival recast as a sweeping stereotype of deceit.
Michael Mumisa
Trinity Hall, University of Cambridge